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Over the past ten years there has been much discussion about whether corporate governance in 
Japan has improved and, if so, whether this results in improved corporate performance.  We 
investigate whether observed changes in Japanese firms’ cash holdings and payout policy are 
consistent with improved governance.  To do this, we benchmark Japanese firms against U.S. 
firms.  We find mixed evidence on whether Japanese governance has improved overall, in that, 
conditional on firm characteristics, the cash holdings of Japanese firms are still systematically 
higher than those of U.S. firms.  There is evidence, however, of a strong increase in total payouts 
(dividends and repurchases) for Japanese firms, especially those that make repurchases.  We also 
find that there is an inverse relation between changes in (excess) cash holdings and changes in 
performance for Japanese firms, consistent with improvements in governance being associated 
with improved performance.  Further, we find that the market valuation of cash holdings was 
lower for Japanese firms than U.S. firms in the 1990s, which is indicative of poorer governance, 
but that this difference largely reverses in the 2000s.  Overall, the evidence suggests that 
governance practices in Japan have improved for some firms, and that when governance does 
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1. Introduction  
In the weeks after Japan’s recent earthquake and tsunami and the ensuing shock to equity 
prices, a great deal of attention focused on whether Japanese equities were “cheap.”1  This is not 
a new perspective.  At least since French and Poterba (1991), it has been clear that common 
valuation metrics for Japanese firms often differ systematically from those of firms in other 
countries.  At the time French and Poterba wrote their paper, Japanese equity prices seemed too 
high.  Since the “bubble” in Japanese real estate and equity prices burst in 1990, the reverse has 
been true—Japanese equities have looked cheap by conventional measures.  Over the last two 
decades, Japanese price-to-book multiples have often been well below those of U.S. firms, with 
many below 1.  So interest in buying Japanese equities is not new, and many non-Japanese 
(foreign) investors have been tempted to buy Japanese equities given their relative valuations.2  
Figure 1 plots the Nikkei 225 from 1984 to the present, which reinforces this point. 
Japanese firms are also known for holding unusually high levels of cash.  Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) examine the cash holdings of companies across the G7, and find that Japanese 
firms held substantially more cash than their G7 counterparts in 1991.  Pinkowitz and 
Williamson (2001) argue that Japan’s main bank system exacerbates this problem because the 
banks induce their industrial affiliates to hold excessive cash as a way of expropriating wealth, a 
result that reinforces earlier findings on the role of main banks in Japan (Weinstein and Yafeh, 
1998).   Because large holdings of cash are generally viewed as symptomatic of poor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, “Buffett casts vote of confidence on Japan,” Financial Times, March 21, 2011.  Buffett is quoted 
as saying that “(i)t will take some time to rebuild but it will not change the economic future of Japan…If I owned 
Japanese stocks, I would certainly not be selling them...Frequently, something out of the blue like this, an 
extraordinary event, really creates a buying opportunity.”  
2 Milhaupt (2003) cites data showing that in 2000, approximately 13% of 779 non-financial firms on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange were trading below their “bust up” values (measured as cash and cash equivalents plus investment 
securities minus debt). 
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governance, this evidence is consistent with the more general view that Japanese companies tend 
to be poorly governed. 
We examine whether recent corporate governance reforms in Japan have resulted in 
improved firm performance.  The Japanese economy has performed persistently poorly over the 
last two decades.  One of the alleged culprits has been Japan’s unusual and (some argue) 
ineffective corporate governance.3  Our goal is to assess whether there has been any progress in 
reforming the governance of Japanese companies and, if so, whether this translates into 
improvements in economic performance.  To do this, we examine whether the cash holdings of 
Japanese companies have declined over the past two decades and whether this has resulted in 
improved performance.  Support for this position could legitimize the argument for “buying 
Japan” because it would imply that investors could “unlock” value by improving the governance 
practices of Japanese firms.  Alternatively, it could be that there are legitimate and intractable 
reasons that Japanese equities are persistently “cheap” using conventional metrics. 
An important distinguishing factor of the Japanese financial system is the role of the 
“main bank” system and the related keiretsu structure (Aoki et al., 1994; Hoshi and Kashyap, 
2001).  Under this system, creditors, especially banks, play an important role in governance, and 
shareholders’ rights are less important.  Since the late 1990s, however, when the Japanese 
Government introduced an extensive set of reforms designed to remake its financial system, 
corporate governance has moved towards a more shareholder-focused model with the goal of 
improving economic performance (Aoki, 2007; Milhaupt, 2006; Patrick, 2004). 
The jury is still out on whether these reforms have led to substantive changes in Japan’s 
corporate governance practices and the performance of its corporate sector.  While in some ways 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Fukao (2003) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) discuss the Japanese financial system and its link to economic 
performance, especially during the 1990s.  Morck and Nakamura (1999) argue that Japanese corporate governance 
helps explain the poor economic performance of the Japanese corporate sector. 
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things have improved—the importance of the banks and the keiretsu system generally have 
declined—in other ways it seems that the old ways of doing business in Japan remain firmly in 
place.4   Some changes that were touted earlier in the 2000s (such as the decline of the keiretsu 
system and corporate cross-holdings of shares) have partially reversed as incumbent managers 
seek to protect themselves from an increasingly active market for corporate control, especially 
from foreign investors (e.g., the rise of defensive mechanisms such as poison pills, a rebound in 
cross-holdings for defensive purposes).5 
We examine the cash holdings of Japanese firms, along with their cash payouts to 
stockholders, as a concrete way of assessing whether corporate governance has improved.  This 
approach has a number of advantages in assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance 
reforms in Japan.  First, this provides a relatively clean way of assessing corporate governance 
reform in Japan.  Although one can measure corporate governance using various metrics and 
indices, these measures generally have limitations because, first, corporate governance is multi-
dimensional and so not subject to direct measurement and, second, because different corporate 
governance structures are likely to be optimal for different firms (e.g., Larcker et al., 2007).  This 
is especially true in Japan, which allows firms to adopt either a western-style model or a more 
traditional Japanese model (Milhaupt, 2003).  
Second, and perhaps more important, the management of cash has become a flashpoint 
for disagreements between corporate managers and investors.  Jensen (1986) discusses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Milhaupt (2003, p. 3) writes that “Over the past decade, the formal institutional environment for Japanese 
corporate governance has been reformed significantly and at an accelerated pace…Yet, despite substantial legal 
reform and decade after Japan’s economic problems emerged, there has been no sea change in Japanese corporate 
governance practices.” 
5 Hamao et al. (2010) provide evidence on the returns to foreign investor activism in Japan between 1998 and 2009.  
They report largely mixed evidence on the ability of activist investors to reform Japanese companies, and 
widespread adoption of poison pills since 2006.  The recent debacle at Olympus has again focused international 
attention on the governance practices of Japanese companies (for example, see “Pressure on Japan to probe 
Olympus,” Financial Times, October 25, 2011). 
	   4 
agency costs of free cash flow, under which managers of firms that generate strong free cash 
flows have a tendency to over-retain cash that is then expropriated or simply wasted on bad 
projects.  LaPorta et al. (2000) find support for this idea using data drawn from a large cross-
section of firms from different countries, showing that dividend payouts decline more strongly in 
growth opportunities for firms in countries with stronger investor protection.  Dittmar et al. 
(2003), Pinkowitz et al. (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Harford et al. (2008), Price et 
al. (2011), among others, also focus on cash holdings and dividend policy as a way of assessing 
the quality of governance practices across firms and countries.  Consistent with this view, activist 
investors frequently cite firms’ cash balances as an example of poor governance, and lobby firms 
to increase cash payouts to shareholders (e.g., Klein and Zur, 2009).  The management of cash 
has become a common focus of battles between external, activist investors and management over 
the last decade in Japan.6   
Our results show that Japanese firms still retain a lot of cash.  The median Japanese non-
financial firm held about 11% of assets in cash in the last three years of our sample period (2006-
2008), only slightly less than the 12% median for early 1990s (1990-1992).  Using regressions 
that control for the effect of firm characteristics on cash holdings, we find that Japanese 
managers have, on average, decreased their holdings of cash over the past decade but that the 
decrease is modest, on the order of 2% of assets.  
To provide a benchmark for assessing the Japanese experience, we also report evidence 
on the cash holdings and payout practices of U.S. firms.  U.S. firms have increased their holdings 
of cash substantially over the last two decades (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Bates et al., 
2009).  Consequently, although Japanese firms have historically held high levels of cash 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See “A Clash over Cash,” The Economist, May 16, 2002.  For a more extensive discussion of activist investing in 
Japan, see Hamao et al. (2010).  Chen et al. (2010) examine how governance affects the cash holdings of Chinese 
firms. 
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compared to firms in other countries, we find that Japanese and U.S. firms now hold roughly 
comparable levels of cash, with the median U.S. firm holding cash of around 10-11% of assets 
over 2003 to 2008.   
Consistent with the idea that Japanese managers now manage cash more like their 
western counterparts, empirical models of cash holdings that do a good job of explaining cash for 
U.S. firms are increasingly useful for Japanese firms.  We find adjusted R-squareds of over 30% 
for U.S. firms in the 1990s and 2000s; for Japanese firms, the adjusted R-squared increases from 
11% in the 1990s to around 25% in the 2000s.  In addition, coefficient signs and magnitudes are 
similar for U.S. and Japanese firms in the 2000s; this is not the case in the 1990s.  Similar to 
previous studies (Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001), we find that Japanese firms that are part of 
keiretsu groups hold less cash than other Japanese firms but more cash than U.S. firms. 
When we use these regression models to control for the effect on cash holdings of firm 
characteristics that vary through time and across firms, we find that Japanese firms still hold 
consistently more cash than U.S. firms.  A Japan dummy in the cash holdings regressions is 
consistently positive and significant, and implies that, after conditioning on firm characteristics, 
Japanese firms hold around 10% more cash (as a fraction of assets) than similar U.S. firms.  
Japanese keiretsu firms hold 4% to 5% less cash (as a fraction of assets) than other Japanese 
firms but still more than U.S. firms. 
Japanese firms have very different dividend policies from those of firms in most other 
countries.  While the fraction of dividend payers in major western economies declines over the 
last 25 years (Fama and French, 2001, Denis and Osobov, 2008), over 80% of Japanese 
industrials continue to pay dividends.  However, these dividends are small compared to those of 
U.S. dividend payers.  In the early 1990s, the median Japanese dividend-payer paid annual 
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dividends of just over 0.5% of total assets, compared to a median of over 2.0% for U.S. firms.  
During the 2000s, Japanese dividend-payers increased the magnitude of their payouts to close to 
1% of total assets, which is still around half of the level for U.S. companies. 
Similar to what has occurred in the U.S. and other countries, stock repurchases have 
become an important way for Japanese firms to return cash to stockholders.  Japanese firms have 
been able to make stock repurchases since the mid-1990s, a practice that was effectively 
prohibited under the Commercial Code and securities exchange laws prior to this time.  We 
report evidence that beginning around 1997, a substantial minority of Japanese firms (in the 10% 
to 30% range over 1999 to 2008) makes repurchases, and that the very large majority of these 
firms also pay dividends (very few firms only make repurchases).  Repurchases contribute to 
strong growth in aggregate real payouts for Japanese firms, from around ¥3 billion in 1999 to 
around ¥10 billion in 2008 (2006 real yen).  Of these totals, aggregate dividends grow from ¥2.4 
billion to ¥6.5 billion, or at a compound annual real rate of 11.7%.  Firms that make repurchases 
as well as paying dividends account for the bulk of this growth, and tend to be the largest firms.  
As a fraction of assets or earnings, these firms pay out roughly three times as much cash as firms 
that only pay dividends.   
We use regression models that explain cash holdings to measure firms’ excess cash and 
assess the persistence of firms’ excess cash levels over time.  For three non-overlapping periods 
(1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2004-2008), we sort firms into deciles based on the excess cash 
measure.  We then report transition matrices which show how firms’ excess cash changes over 
these periods.  This analysis shows that firms’ excess cash levels tend to be persistent, that the 
persistence is larger for Japanese firms than U.S. firms, and that the persistence is more 
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pronounced for Japanese firms with high levels of excess cash.  These are the firms that we posit 
have the most serious governance problems.   
We then analyze whether changes in excess cash during these periods are associated with 
changes in performance.  For Japanese but not U.S. firms we find an inverse relation between 
changes in holdings of (excess) cash and changes in firm performance (ROE, ROA).  This is 
consistent with our argument that firms that lower cash holdings do so because of improved 
governance, and that this is associated with improved performance.  We also find that 
performance generally improves for keiretsu firms over these periods, although there is no 
evidence of any interaction between this effect and changes in these firms’ excess cash holdings. 
We also investigate whether there has been a change in investors’ valuation of the cash 
holdings of Japanese firms.  Following the idea that cash holdings are more vulnerable to 
expropriation or waste by managers (Myers and Rajan, 1998), Pinkowitz et al. (2006) and 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use country-level governance data and provide evidence that 
investors systematically discount the cash holdings of poorly governed firms.  We adapt this 
approach to our setting and find that: (i) investors’ valuations of Japanese firms’ cash holdings 
were systematically lower than those of U.S. firms in the 1990s, consistent with Japanese firms 
being poorly governed during that period, and (ii) the valuation of cash for Japanese firms, on 
average, improves in the 2000s in that differences relative to U.S. firms largely disappear.  This 
is consistent with the idea that, on average, the governance practices of Japanese firms improve 
over time, resulting in better management of cash and so higher cash valuations, consistent with 
our evidence on cash holdings and firm performance. 
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The next section provides details of sample selection and data.  Section 3 provides the 
empirical analysis on cash holdings while Section 4 provides evidence on the valuation of cash 
holdings.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Sample and data 
Our sample and data are from WorldScope, collected via Thomson Reuters DataStream.  
The initial sample includes all Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange and JASDAQ 
(Japanese OTC market), and all U.S. firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ.  The 
sample period is from 1980 to 2008 although certain data requirements described below 
effectively limit our sample to 1990 to 2008.  Because our sample period begins in 1990, it 
encompasses the early 1990s bursting of the bubble in Japan, which began the economic malaise, 
and so is a suitable starting point for our study (see Figure 1).7  We delete observations with 
missing total assets.  We exclude firms from the utilities, transportation, and financial industries 
because their cash holdings and payout policies are likely to differ from those of industrials. 
Bates et al. (2009) define cash as the sum of cash and marketable securities in their study 
of U.S. firms.  Because of possible differences in Japanese firms’ use of marketable securities, 
we exclude marketable securities and measure cash holdings as cash divided by total assets.8  To 
be consistent, we do the same for U.S. firms.   
Our data on Japanese firms’ stock repurchases comes from Nikkei Quest, supplemented 
by data drawn directly from the financial statements of Japanese firms.  Measuring share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 “Traditional” governance practices were still in place in the early 1990s, including almost exclusive reliance by 
firms on bank financing, the importance of the main bank/keiretsu system, substantial corporate cross-holdings, etc.  
Reforms began in the mid to late 1990s as the economic problems deepened and there was universal recognition of 
the need for reform (e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001). 
8 Pinkowitz and Wiliamson (2001) also exclude holdings of marketable securities in measuring cash for Japanese 
firms.  There is an upward trend in U.S. firms’ holdings of marketable securities, from less than 5% of assets in the 
early 1990s to 8-10% of assets in the mid 2000s.  Japanese firms tend to hold a lower fraction of marketable 
securities than U.S. firms, especially after 2000 when the median Japanese firm held less than 1% of assets as 
marketable securities.  Mark-to-market accounting for marketable securities was introduced in Japan in 2001, which 
likely affected Japanese firms’ holdings of these securities (a similar rule was introduced in the U.S. in 1994). 
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repurchases is not straightforward using U.S. data, and is even less so using Japanese data.  The 
measurement of repurchases in Japanese firms is described further below. 
3. Evidence on cash holdings and corporate performance 
3.1 Comparison of cash holdings, valuation, and profitability of Japanese and U.S. firms 
In this section we report evidence on the comparative cash holdings, valuation, 
performance, and payout policy of Japanese and U.S. companies since 1990.  Table 1 presents 
means and medians for four variables—cash deflated by total assets, market-to-book ratio, price-
earning ratio, and profitability (EBIT/TA)—by country and year.  We then report certain payout 
policy comparisons in Figures 2 and 3, as well as more detailed data on how Japanese firms’ 
payouts to shareholders, including repurchases, changes over time.9 
We first report on cash holdings.  Bates et al. (2009) report a large increase in the cash 
holdings of U.S. industrial firms from 1980 to 2006 (see also Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith, 2007).  
This same trend is evident in our data.  In 1990, the mean (median) cash holdings of U.S. firms 
represented 6.9% (2.8%) of assets.  This number increases steadily over the sample period, 
reaching 17.4% (10.9%) in 2008.     
For Japanese firms, mean (median) cash holdings were 16.0% (13.8%) in 1990, 
substantially higher than those of U.S. firms, consistent with the evidence in Rajan and Zingales 
(1995).10  After 1990 there is a decline in the cash holdings of Japanese companies through 1997 
and 1998, when the average reaches around 11% (median 9%).  After this, there is a modest 
increase to a mean (median) of 13.9% (10.8%) in 2008, numbers similar to those of U.S. 
companies.  For 2007 and 2008 we cannot reject the null that the median cash holdings of U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 To control for outliers that may impact our results, return-on-asset (EBIT/lagged TA) ratios that are greater than 1 
(less than -1) are set to 1 (-1).  Cash-to-total assets ratios that are greater than 1 (less than 0) are set to 1 (0).  Market-
to-book ratios that are greater than 30 (less than 1) are set to 30 (1).  10	  In	  Table	  1,	  italicized	  numbers	  for	  Japanese	  firms	  indicate	  that	  the	  number	  is	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  corresponding	  number	  for	  U.S.	  firms	  at	  the	  5%	  level	  or	  better	  under	  two-­‐tailed	  tests.	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and Japanese firms, both at 11%, are the same.  These results indicate that the tendency for 
Japanese firms to hold systematically more cash that their U.S. counterparts no longer holds.  We 
revisit this conclusion below, however, once we look at regressions that control for the effect of 
firm characteristics on cash holdings. 
Consistent with the idea that Japanese companies appear undervalued relative to U.S. 
companies, the evidence in Table 1 shows that market-to-book ratios are systematically lower for 
Japanese firms.  Over the 1990s, market-to-book ratios for U.S. companies average 3.60 (median 
2.16) while those for Japanese companies average 2.49 (median 1.72).  During the 2000s the 
differences widen, with corresponding numbers of 3.40 (2.06) for U.S. companies and 1.97 
(1.06) for Japanese companies.  Differences are highly statistically significant.  These differences 
are unlikely to be fully attributable to accounting differences, as discussed further below.11   
The time-series of P/E ratios for Japanese firms also makes it easy to understand why 
foreign investors have become increasingly interested in these firms.  After reaching a peak in 
1994, when the mean (median) P/E ratio was 93 (51), P/E ratios for Japanese firms decline 
consistently.  While partly due to a decline in Japanese equity prices (Figure 1), this is also due 
to a consistent increase in Japanese firms’ EPS, perhaps due to the fact that Japanese accounting 
rules changed significantly over this period as part of the overall effort to reform corporate 
governance.  Many rules changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with most changes intended 
to align Japanese accounting with U.S. and U.K. GAAP rules (Japan is yet to adopt IFRS).12   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The greater propensity for U.S. firms to record accounting write-downs, restructuring charges, etc., (which drives 
the differential skewness of the ROA numbers, discussed below), causes, through double-entry, a corresponding 
decline in book values, skewing market-to-book ratios upwards for U.S. firms. 
12 French and Poterba (1991) discuss the fact that the high P/E ratios they observed in the 1980s for Japanese 
companies was partly driven by differences in accounting pushing down EPS numbers, including the fact that most 
financial statements in Japan were not consolidated.  These accounting differences had largely disappeared by the 
early 2000s, which possibly explains at least part of this trend. 
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P/E ratios for U.S. firms show little trend, with the median varying in a tight range 
around 20 and the mean varying over a wider range between approximately 30 and 40.  Because 
of the persistent fall in the P/E ratios of Japanese firms, mean and median P/E ratios for Japanese 
and U.S. companies are similar over 2003 through 2008.  Differences in means are insignificant 
for 2003 through 2007 and in some years, such as 2001, are significantly higher for U.S. firms. 
We next use accounting profitability (ROA, defined as EBIT on lagged total assets) to 
compare the economic performance of Japanese and U.S. firms.  There are two notable features 
of these numbers.  First, the cross-section of profitability has become increasingly skewed for 
U.S. firms, in part because of the increasing rate of losses.  In the early 1990s, mean and median 
ROA varies between 9% and 11%.  However, these series diverge by increasing amounts as the 
1990s progress, due largely to increasing left-skewness in the earnings cross-section, a trend that 
continues through the 2000s.13  In contrast, to the extent skewness is evident for Japanese firms, 
it is right-skewness rather than left skewness—Japanese firms do not display the tendency of 
U.S. firms to report large write-downs and losses.   
Second, Japanese firms are less profitable that their U.S. counterparts through the 1990s.  
In 1990 and 1991, median ROA for Japanese firms is around 7%.  From 1992 through 1994, 
however, as the post-crash recession took hold, median ROA falls to less than 4%, and then to 
around 3% by 2002.  After 2002, there is steady increase in median ROA as the Japanese 
economy improves, so that median ROA reaches nearly 6% by 2007.  During the 1990s, U.S. 
firms’ median ROA consistently exceeds 8%, well above that for Japanese firms.  There is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13This increasing left skewness is due to at least two related phenomenon.  First, as discussed by Fama and French 
(2004), there has been a systematic shift in the nature of U.S. publicly-traded firms, with firms tending to go public 
earlier in their life cycles.  Second, U.S. firms are reporting losses at an increasing rate (Hayn, 1995; Klein and 
Marquardt, 2006), and these losses tend to increase in size over time.  In our data, U.S. firms report losses in 28% of 
firm/years in the 1990s and 38% of firm/years in the 2000s; corresponding numbers for Japanese firms are 17% and 
19%, respectively. 
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decline in 2001 due to the U.S. recession, followed by a rebound to around 8% over 2004 
through 2007.  So U.S. firms continue to outperform Japanese firms, but the gap is not as wide as 
was the case in the 1990s.  Further, the profitability of Japanese firms displays much less cross-
sectional variability than for U.S. firms. 
To summarize, in the early 1990s, Japanese industrials looked very different to their U.S. 
counterparts, with higher holdings of cash, higher P/E ratios but lower market-to-book ratios, and 
substantially lower profitability.  However, by the mid to late 2000s Japanese and U.S. 
companies looked more similar: U.S. firms had increased their holdings of cash while Japanese 
companies had improved their profitability.  P/E ratios for Japanese companies are now largely 
in-line with those of U.S. firms.  However, market-to-book ratios of Japanese companies are still 
lower than those of U.S. firms, and profitability is still 200 to 300 basis points lower than that of 
U.S. firms. 
3.2 Payout policy for Japanese firms   
We next compare the dividend policies of U.S. and Japanese firms.  Figure 2 reports the 
fraction of dividend-payers in each country.  As expected based on Fama and French (2001), 
there is a consistent decline in the fraction of U.S. dividend-payers over most of this period, from 
55% in 1990 to around 20% in 2002.  However, after 2002 the fraction of dividend-payers 
increases steadily, to around 30% in 2007 and 2008.14  The fraction of dividend-payers in Japan 
is much higher than that in the U.S. throughout this period.  This fraction is over 90% in the early 
1990s, falls slowly to around 80% in the late 1990s and to 78% by 2002, before increasing to 
87% in 2008.  These trends (through the early 2000s) are similar to those reported by Denis and 
Osobov (2008) in their comparison of payout policy across the G7.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14See Floyd et al. (2011) for more discussion of recent trends in the payout policy of U.S. firms. 
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Although a much higher fraction of Japanese firms pay dividends, those dividends are 
substantially smaller than those paid by U.S. firms.  Figure 3 plots the median size of dividends, 
computed as (annual) common cash dividends deflated by total assets (these numbers are 
computed across the set of dividend payers only).  In 1990 the median annual dividend paid by 
U.S. firms was around 2% of total assets compared to 0.6% for Japanese firms.  The size of the 
dividend paid by the median U.S. dividend-payer falls steadily during the 1990s and early 2000s, 
reaching a low of 1.4% in 2003.  After that there is a rebound, with the median returning to 2% 
in 2008.  The dividends of Japanese firms are largely flat through the 1990s but increase over the 
2000s, with the median reaching around 0.9% by 2008.  Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
dividends paid by Japanese firms remain smaller than those of their U.S. counterparts, with U.S. 
firms’ dividends consistently at least twice the size of those for Japanese firms. 
Dividends, however, paint an incomplete picture of payout policy given the emergence of 
stock repurchases.  Stock repurchases emerge in significant quantities for U.S. firms in the early 
1980s (e.g., Bagwell and Shoven, 1989; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008).  There is 
little evidence on stock repurchases for Japanese companies.  As we discuss in more detail in the 
appendix, restrictions on stock repurchases by Japanese companies were gradually lifted 
beginning in the mid 1990s.  Following previous research using U.S. data, we measure Japanese 
repurchases as changes in treasury stock (if the company uses treasury stock) or as net stock 
purchases from the cash flow statement; see appendix for more detail.  Figure 4 reports the 
fraction of Japanese firms in four non-mutually exclusive groups: firms that pay dividends, firms 
that pay repurchases, firms that pay both dividends and repurchases, and firms that pay neither 
dividends nor repurchases (non-payers).  Figure 5 reports aggregate dividends and repurchases 
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paid by Japanese firms, measured in 2006 yen.  In both cases repurchases are reported over 1994 
to 2010, which covers the emergence of repurchases in Japan. 
Figure 4 shows that the fraction of Japanese firms making repurchases increases from 
close to 0 in 1997 to around 10% from 1999 to 2001 and then fluctuates from in the 12% to 30% 
range from 2002 to 2010.  The increase over 1997 to the early 2000s is likely explained by the 
gradual liberalization of legal restrictions on repurchases that occurs from 1994 to 2001 (see 
appendix for more detail).  The variation in the fraction of repurchases since 2001 likely reflects 
variation in payouts; the principal advantage of repurchases is that they do not commit managers 
to an ongoing payout.  Figure 4 also shows that very few firms make repurchases without also 
paying dividends (the fraction of firms that pay both closely tracks the fraction that make 
repurchases).  This is also similar to the evidence for U.S. firms  
Figure 5 shows the aggregate amount of payouts by Japanese firms divided into 
dividends and repurchases (in billions of 2006 yen).  The growth of repurchases that begins 
around 1997 is also clear in this figure.  The use of repurchases by Japanese firms leads to a 
strong increase in aggregate payouts from 2000 through 2008, with dividends also increasing 
strongly over this period.  Total payouts increase from ¥3 billion in 1999 to ¥10 billion in 2008.  
Of these amounts, repurchases increase from approximately ¥0.6 billion to ¥3.5 billion while 
dividends increase from ¥2.4 billion to ¥6.5 billion.  While the overall growth in total payouts is 
similar to that for US firms over the same period (Floyd et al., 2011), in Japan payouts and the 
growth therein is more heavily tilted towards dividends than repurchases.  The fact that these 
Japanese firms increase payouts so strongly offers evidence of an improvement in governance. 
This increased payout by Japanese firms is not shared equally among all types of payers.  
For those firms that only pay dividends, total real payout increases by 59% over the 1999 to 2008 
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period, and contributes to around 16% of the overall increase in aggregate real payout (these 
results not reported in tables).  For those firms that both pay dividends and make repurchases, the 
increase in total real payout is 636% over this period, and accounts for 84% of the overall 
increase.  Put differently, the annual compound real growth rate for firms that only pay dividends 
is 5.3% compared to 24.8% for firms that pay both dividends and repurchases.15  So the strong 
growth in real payouts, while clearly respectable for the dividend-only firms, is driven largely by 
firms that now pay both dividends and repurchases, which is similar to what we see for U.S. 
firms (Skinner, 2008; Floyd et al., 2011).  
Tables 2 and 3 provide further evidence on the characteristics and payouts of three groups 
of Japanese firms: non-payers, firms that only pay dividends, and firms that pay both dividends 
and repurchases.  Table 2 shows that the largest firms tend to pay both dividends and 
repurchases, and that the firms that pay dividends tend to be larger than non-payers (these 
differences are typically significant for medians and are less often significant for means).  In 
addition, and perhaps not surprisingly, dividend payers in general are much more profitable than 
non-payers, which report relatively poor performance.  Further, while dividend payers tended to 
be slightly more profitable than firms that pay both dividends and repurchases from 1999 
through 2004, these differences disappear in more recent years.   
Table 3 compares the magnitude of payouts for firms that only pay dividends to the 
magnitude of payouts for firms that pay both dividends and repurchases.  While it may not be 
surprising that firms that make repurchases in addition to paying dividends pay out more, the 
magnitude of the difference is substantial, which complements the evidence above on aggregate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 These results are based on a comparison of payouts for the set of firms that pay only dividends in each year to 
firms that pay both dividends and repurchases in each year.  Membership in each group changes from one year to the 
next (that is, a firm would move from the dividend-only group to the “both” group in those years it pays 
repurchases). 
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payouts.  While the median dividend-only firm pays dividends that vary from 0.6% of assets in 
1998 to 0.8% of assets in 2008, the median firm that pays both dividends and repurchases pays 
out two to three times this amount, from 1.4% to 2.2% of assets, depending on year.  If we 
instead deflate payouts by earnings (net income) to compute payout ratios, the median dividend-
only firm pays out around 20% of earnings fairly consistently (the ratio is higher at the beginning 
and end of the sample period, when earnings were low), while the median firm that pays both 
pays out considerably more, from 49% to 85% of earnings, with a median of 60%.  Overall, the 
evidence shows that those Japanese firms that make repurchases as well as paying dividends pay 
out substantially more than Japanese firms that only pay dividends.  In future drafts we will 
investigate how these measures of payout policy are related to changes in corporate performance 
and valuation. 
3.3 Cash Regressions 
Our primary interest is in whether there have been systematic changes in Japanese firms’ 
payout policies and cash balances (our proxy for corporate governance improvements) that are 
related to changes in these firms’ economic performance.  To model cash balances, we follow 
Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009).  Based on the transactions costs and precautionary 
demands for cash,16 these papers model cash holdings as a function of firm size, a dividend-
payer dummy, leverage, profitability, a loss dummy, market-to-book, the fraction of closely-held 
shares, industry sigma, net working capitals, R&D intensity, capital expenditures, and cash 
flow.17   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The idea behind the transactions costs argument is that raising funds or liquidating assets involves transactions 
costs that can be avoided by holding cash.  The precautionary demand argument says that cash is valuable because it 
can be used to finance investments if alternative sources of funding become unavailable or too costly. 
17 We measure size as the natural log of total assets, leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, ROE as 
net income deflated by lagged total assets, net working capital as current assets minus current liabilities minus cash, 
R&D as research and development expenditures deflated by sales, capital expenditures as capital expenditures 
deflated by lagged total assets, and cash flow as funds from operations deflated by lagged total assets. 
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Following Bates et al. (2009), we construct industry sigma as the mean of the standard 
deviations of cash flow/assets over the past 10 years for firms in a given industry.  We define 
industry using the industry group variable (WC06011) from WorldScope.  We use a three-digit 
code for miscellaneous industry and two-digit codes for all other industries.  Because this 
computation requires ten years of past cash flow data, industry sigma could not be calculated for 
observations before 1990.  As a result, most of our analyses include a sample period from 1990 
to 2008. 
We use two types of estimation.  First, we estimate regressions separately for each 
country, both for the overall period (1990-2008) and by decade (1990-1999 and 2000-2008); 
these results are reported in Table 4.  This allows us to assess whether the economic 
determinants of cash holdings differ significantly across Japanese and U.S. firms, as well as to 
gauge how these determinants change over time in each country.  When we estimate the 
regressions for the full time period, we include dummies for 2000-2003 and 2004-2008 to see 
how cash balances change in each country after 1999 after conditioning on firm characteristics.  
Second, we estimate annual pooled cross-sectional regressions for all U.S. and Japanese 
companies with data available in a given year (Table 5).  These regressions include Japan and 
Japan/keiretsu intercept dummies to assess whether the cash holdings of Japanese companies are 
systematically different from those of U.S. companies conditional on the other variables. 
For the Japanese firms, the Table 4 regressions also include a measure of keiretsu 
inclination.  As discussed in Section 1, the extent to which Japanese firms are affiliated with 
corporate groups is likely to systematically affect corporate policies such as cash holdings and 
payouts.  The direction of this effect is not clear, however.  Some authors argue that firms in 
these groups have less severe information and agency problems, which implies they are likely to 
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hold less cash and distribute more cash to shareholders (e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap, 2001; 
Dewenter and Warther, 1998).  Other authors argue that the banks that sit at the heart of these 
groups use their influence to cause keiretsu firms to hold excessive cash balances as part of a 
systematic expropriation of external holders (e.g., Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Weinstein 
and Yafeh, 1998). 
Following Dewenter and Warther (1998), we define keiretsu firms as those that belong to 
one of the largest six large horizontal keiretsu, also known as enterprise groups.18  We obtain 
these data from Industrial Groupings in Japan (IGJ, 2001), a standard source of these data, and 
classify firms as either keiretsu firms (if they are classified in IGJ as horizontal keiretsu firms 
with inclination scores of 2-4) or not (otherwise).19  We assume that keiretsu affiliation does not 
change over the sample period. 
Table 4 reports the first set of regression estimates.  As indicated above, for each country 
regressions are estimated for the full period as well as for two sub-periods (with two-way 
clustering of standard errors).  For U.S. firms, these regressions have R-squares of 30.5% for 
1990-1999, 32.0% for 2000-2008, and 33.1% for the overall period.  Coefficients on key 
variables are mostly in-line with those of Opler et al. (1999) and Bates et al. (2009).  Cash 
holdings are positively related to industry sigma, market-to-book, R&D intensity, and cash flow, 
and negatively related to size, dividend payment, leverage, net working capital, and capital 
expenditures.  The significance and magnitude of regression coefficients are mostly consistent 
across sub-periods (one notable exception is the coefficient on industry sigma, which is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18 See Hoshi and Kashyap (2001, pp. 10-12) for more discussion of the nature of these groups.  	  
19 IGJ measures inclination based on five factors: (i) the characteristics and historical background of the groups 
and/or the company; (ii) sources and amount of bank loans, (iii) board of directors sent by and/or sent to nucleus 
and/or other group companies, (iv) the company attitude towards the group, (v) the company connections with other 
groups and/or non-group companies.  Measured inclination ranges from 0 (none) to 5 (for “nucleus” firms that have 
the strongest group affiliations).  IGJ has not released updated data since 2001. 
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substantially lower in the second sub-period).  The period dummies (for 2000-2003 and 2004-
2008) are positive and significant, indicating that U.S. firms increased their propensity to hold 
cash in the 2000s by about 1% to 2% of assets after controlling for firm characteristics. 
The model does not explain cash balances as well for Japanese firms in the 1990s.  For 
1990-1999, the adjusted R-squared is 11.4%, about a third of that for U.S. firms.  The only 
variables that are significant in this regression are dividend payer (which is reliably positive, 
opposite to the result for U.S. firms), ROE (reliably positive, consistent with the result for U.S. 
firms), R&D intensity (reliably positive, also consistent), and capex (reliably negative, also 
consistent).  The keiretsu dummy is reliably negative, indicating that these firms hold about 3% 
less cash than other firms.   
Results are more similar to those for U.S. firms in the second sub-period.  For this period 
the adjusted R-squared increases to 25.4% and the coefficients on size, leverage, market-to-book, 
industry sigma, net working capital, R&D, capex, and cash flow are consistent with those for 
U.S. firms, in terms of sign and significance of coefficients.  Once again, the dividend-payer 
variable is positive rather than negative—in Japan, dividend-payers have higher, not lower, cash 
balances (recall that Japanese dividends are typically much smaller than those paid in the U.S., 
and that a large majority of Japanese firms pay dividends).  Thus, Japanese firms with more cash 
are more likely to pay dividends, but these dividends are small enough not to affect cash 
holdings materially.  The coefficient on industry sigma is also much larger than it is for U.S. 
firms in the 2000s, suggesting that the precautionary demand is more important for Japanese 
firms.  Finally, consistent with results for the 1990s, the coefficient on the keiretsu dummy is 
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negative and highly significant, indicating that keiretsu firms hold about 3% less of assets in cash 
than other Japanese firms.20   
Overall, this evidence indicates that the determinants of cash for Japanese firms become 
more similar to those of U.S. firms in the 2000s than they were in the 1990s.  One interpretation 
is that Japanese managers are now more conscious of the need to manage cash effectively, so 
their cash holdings are more sensitive to firm characteristics that measure the economic 
determinants of cash holdings, consistent with the view that governance practices have improved 
in Japan.  In addition, the 2004-2008 period dummy in the full period regression is significantly 
negative, indicating a modest decline (of around 2% of assets) in the average cash holdings of 
Japanese firms once we condition on firm characteristics. 
Table 5 reports on the second set of cash regressions.  Here, we estimate a single 
regression in each annual cross-section with all available U.S. and Japanese firms, with dummies 
for Japanese firms and keiretsu firms (the keiretsu variable is set to zero for U.S. firms).  The 
idea is to compare the cash holdings of Japanese firms in general, as well as keiretsu firms in 
particular, to those of U.S. firms after conditioning on other firm characteristics that affect cash 
holdings.  To economize on the numbers we report, Table 5 only reports the coefficients on these 
two intercept dummy variables.21  For ease of comparison, Figure 6 plots the coefficients on the 
Japan intercept dummies as well as the sum of these coefficients and the keiretsu dummies, to 
show how the cash holdings of Japanese firms and Japanese keiretsu firms, respectively, 
compare to U.S. firms (i.e., the figure plots the differences versus U.S. firms).   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) also find a significantly negative coefficient on a keiretsu dummy variable in 
cross-sectional cash regressions. 
21 In most cases, the sign and significance of the coefficients is roughly consistent with that for the regressions 
reported in Table 4, although for those variables where there was some inconsistency between the results for the 
U.S. and Japanese firms, the coefficients are less significant.  For example, in Table 4 the coefficient on the 
dividend-payer dummy is negative for U.S. firms and positive for Japanese firms, so it is not surprising that the 
results on this variable are less significant in the pooled cross-sectional regressions.   
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The coefficient on the Japan intercept dummy is reliably positive in all years, indicating 
that Japanese firms hold more cash than U.S. firms.  The differences are largest in the early 
1990s, when the coefficients indicate that Japanese firms held substantially more cash than U.S. 
firms, with differences ranging from 15% to 19% of total assets.  These differences decline from 
1996 through 2001, reaching a low of 3.5% in 2001, but then rebound to 11%-12% over 2003 to 
2007.  There is no obvious evidence here in favor of the hypothesis that Japanese firms reduce 
their holdings of cash as corporate governance improves over the past decade: while there was a 
steady decline in cash holdings over 1994 to 2001, a good part of this reverses over 2003-2007 
although cash holdings over the period are still substantially lower than during the early 1990s.   
Consistent with the previous results, the coefficient on the keiretsu dummy is reliably negative in 
all years with some time variation: keiretsu firms hold 3% to 5% less cash than other Japanese 
firms over most of the time period (with smaller differences in the later 1990s and early 2000s) 
but still hold more cash than U.S. firms. 
The differences in the cash holdings of the U.S. and Japanese firms implied by these 
regressions are larger than the univariate differences reported in Table 1, suggesting that changes 
in firm characteristics across the two countries help explain the smaller differences evident there.  
These results indicate that Japanese firms, on average, still hold substantially more cash than 
U.S. firms, even given the fact that U.S. firms have increased their cash holdings significantly 
since 1990. 
3.4 Excess cash and the relation to firm performance 
 Based on our working assumption that Japanese firms’ management of cash is a proxy for 
the quality of their corporate governance, we next report on two aspects of changes in firms’ 
management of cash.  First, we use the regression models discussed above to sort sample firms 
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into deciles based on their holdings of excess cash in each year.  To do this, we use the residuals 
from the regressions reported in Table 4 (estimated for U.S. and Japanese firms separately for the 
full time period, without the time dummies) to proxy for excess cash.  We then look to see how 
stable this characteristic is—do firms consistently, over a period of years, hold high or low levels 
of excess cash?  If they persistently hold high levels of excess cash, that would indicate relatively 
poor governance.  Conversely, firms that improve their management of cash (excess cash 
declines over time) likely do so because of improved governance.   
Second, we look to see whether changes in excess cash (measured as movements across 
excess cash deciles over time) are associated with changes in firm performance (measured as 
changes in ROA and ROE).  We expect to see that declines in excess cash holdings are related to 
improvements in performance for Japanese firms.  We also condition these results on whether 
the Japanese firms are part of keiretsu, as defined above. 
 We report the results of these analyses in Tables 6.  Panel A of Table 6 presents excess 
cash transition matrices for U.S. firms while Panel B reports the same matrices for Japanese 
firms.  To perform this analysis, we sort firms into excess cash deciles in an initial year and then 
re-sort in the final year of each period.  We report transitions for three periods, 1994-1999, 1999-
2004, and 2004-2008.  Although these time periods are arbitrary, we think they make sense as a 
way of assessing the “stickiness” of firms’ cash policies over the sample period while 
economizing on the number of analyses.  The transition matrices report percentages based on the 
rows, and so add to 100 across rows.  Each row comprises observations in a given excess cash 
decile for the initial year, from 1 to 10, where 1 denotes the lowest excess cash and 10 the 
highest excess cash.   The columns comprise deciles defined in the same way in the last year.  
Thus, observations on the diagonal are those that are in the same decile in the first and last years.  
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Observations above the diagonal are those for which excess cash increases so that firms move up 
the deciles.  For example, observations in row 2, column 3 move from decile 2 in the first year to 
decile 3 in the last year.  This analysis requires that firms have available data in the first and last 
years of each period; for this reason, especially in the earlier period, we have relatively few 
observations. 
 If membership in excess cash deciles is independent over time, we would see percentages 
of 10 in all cells.  However, looking at the numbers in Table 6, we in fact see clustering, most 
notably in cells on the diagonal and just off the diagonal, indicating that firms’ relative levels of 
excess cash tend to persist over time.  To get a more parsimonious way of comparing the 
matrices, we focus on the extremes of high and low excess cash, and sum the percentages in the 
nine extreme north-west (low excess cash) and south-east (high excess cash) cells.  For example, 
for U.S. firms over 1994-1999, this number is 117 for the nine low excess cash cells (firms in 
deciles 1, 2, or 3 in both years) and 124 in the nine high excess cash cells (firms in deciles 8, 9, 
or 10 in both years).  This is more than expected by chance (90 = 9 x 10) and so indicates 
“stickiness” at both extremes.  Numbers are similar at the high end of excess cash for U.S. firms 
for 1999-2004 and 2004-2008 (totals are 131 and 129, respectively) and get somewhat higher 
than this at the low end (totals are 168 and 145), which indicates increased persistence at low 
levels of excess cash. 
 Consistent with the view of Japanese firms’ cash management practices discussed in 
Section 1, the persistence of excess cash tends to be more pronounced for Japanese firms, 
especially at high levels of excess cash.  For these firms, at the low (high) end of excess cash the 
percentages are 156 (217), 151 (169), and 202 (191) for the three periods, respectively.  These 
numbers are noticeably higher than those for U.S. firms in 5 of 6 cases.  Moreover, this is always 
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true for the high excess cash deciles, indicating that Japanese firms with high levels of excess 
cash tend to continue that practice over time, more so than U.S. firms in the same situation, and 
(usually) more so than Japanese firms with low excess cash levels.  These firms (Japanese firms 
with high excess cash) are the ones that we posit as having poor governance practices. 
 We next link changes in excess cash to firm performance.  For each country and each 
transition period, we divide observations into those for which excess cash increases or decreases, 
measured based on whether firms move up or down the deciles from the first year to the last 
year.  If improvements in cash management practices (lower excess cash) result from 
improvements in governance, we expect this to translate into improved performance, and vice 
versa.  We expect any such effect to be more pronounced for Japanese firms, for which we argue 
that cash management practices and corporate performance have both been relatively poor due to 
poor governance.  Table 6 also reports the results of this analysis—in particular, we report the 
change in profitability (measured as ROA and ROE) over the transition period for the two groups 
(higher and lower excess cash).   
 There is little evidence of any relation between excess cash transitions and changes in 
performance for U.S. firms.  For two of the three transition periods (1999-2004 and 2004-2008), 
the changes are similar across the two groups (increases and decreases in deciles) and differences 
are not statistically significant.  For the first period (1994-1999) the differences are significant 
and show, contrary to expectations, that firms that moved down the deciles (lower excess cash) 
performed worse than firms that moved up the deciles.   
The results for Japanese firms suggest that firms that improve their cash management 
practices enjoy better performance than firms for which cash management gets worse.  In all 
three periods, firms that move down the deciles (that lower excess cash) display changes in 
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performance that exceed those for firms that move up the deciles.  In the most recent period 
(2004 through 2008), firms that move up the deciles report a mean change in ROA (ROE) of -
1.4% (-2.8%) versus 0.4% (-0.2%) for firms that move down the deciles, a difference significant 
at the 5% (10%) level (two tailed).  Results are stronger in the second period (1999 through 
2004), with differences in ROA (ROE) significant at 5% (1%).  In the earliest period, these 
differences are not significant for ROA but are significant at 1% for ROE (although there are 
relatively few observations in the first transition period).22   
The Table 6 results show that, consistent with our predictions, there is an inverse relation 
between changes in excess cash and changes in performance for Japanese firms.  Table 7 
examines how this result varies across keiretsu and non-keiretsu firms in Japan by regressing the 
change in performance for a given period on the change in excess cash decile, the keiretsu 
dummy, and an interaction between these variables.  Based on the evidence above, we expect a 
negative coefficient on the change in excess cash decile.  The interaction term tests whether this 
effect is systematically different for keiretsu firms, a possibility given their different governance 
characteristics.  We estimate these regressions for the two performance measures (ROA and 
ROE), for the three time periods, and for the full period pooled.  We multiply coefficients by 100 
so they can be interpreted as percentages.  
The Table 7 results for ROA confirm the findings from Table 6: there is an inverse 
relation between changes in excess cash and changes in performance for Japanese firms.  The 
coefficient on the change in excess cash decile is negative and statistically significant for the 
second and third sub-periods (1999-2004 and 2004-2008) as well as overall, with t-statistics of -
2.27, -2.36, and -3.27, respectively.  The coefficients seem reasonable in economic terms.  The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22Differences in medians tests (two-sample Wilcoxon rank sums) are also statistically significant at the 5 level or 
better for 1999-2004 and 2004-2008 and at the 10 level or better for 1994-1999. 
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overall coefficient is -0.33, implying that moving down five excess cash deciles (holding less 
excess cash) improves performance by 165 basis points. These regressions also indicate that 
keiretsu firms generally improve their performance relative to non-keiretsu firms over the second 
and third sub-periods, by 131 basis points (t = 1.65) and 159 basis points (t = 2.68), respectively, 
as well as overall (by 140 basis points, t = 3.16).  This is evidence that keiretsu firms have 
performed better than other Japanese firms since 1999.23  There is little evidence of an 
interaction between the cash and keiretsu effects.  
The Table 7 results for ROE are similar but not as strong as those for ROA.24  The 
coefficient on the change in excess cash decile is negative and significant for the overall period 
and the second sub-period (1999-2004) but not in either of the other periods.  In the third sub-
period, the keiretsu variable is again reliably positive, with a coefficient of .038 (t = 2.90), as 
well as being significant for the overall period.  The interaction term is significantly negative 
overall but only significant in the first sub-period (t = -2.13), similar to the results for ROA, 
suggesting a relation between cash holdings and performance for the keiretsu firms.   
Overall, these results are consistent with our view that poor cash management practices 
are indicative of poor governance in Japanese firms, and that improvements in cash management 
(lower excess cash) are associated with improved corporate performance.  Thus, while the 
evidence in Tables 4 and 5 provides somewhat mixed evidence on whether the cash management 
practices of Japanese firms improve over time, the evidence in Tables 6 and 7 shows that cross-
sectional variation in Japanese firms’ holdings of cash is inversely related to changes in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 One possible explanation for this is that foreign investors are more likely to invest in keiretsu firms and then push 
for improvements in governance and performance, an idea we will test in the next version of the paper. 
24 We place less weight on the ROE numbers (which are based on bottom-line earnings) relative to ROA (which are 
based on EBIT) for two reasons.  First, ROE includes the effect of taxes, which is likely to muddy the waters in 
terms of measuring economic performance.  Second, and more important, ROE reflects the effects of extraordinary 
items, which in Japan includes a larger set of non-operating items than in the U.S., which also distorts the usefulness 
of net income and hence ROE as a measure of economic performance. 
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performance—for those Japanese firms that improve their cash management practices by holding 
less excess cash there are improvements in performance.    
4. Cash holdings, governance, and valuation 
Our basic research question is whether the relatively high cash holdings of Japanese 
companies reflect poor governance practices, whether these practices improve over the last ten 
years, and, to the extent they have, whether this has translated into improved corporate 
performance.  The evidence in Section 3 shows that Japanese companies tend to hold relatively 
large amounts of cash and that changes in cash holdings are inversely related to improvements in 
corporate performance, consistent with the idea that improvements in governance, as manifested 
in lower holdings of excess cash, are related to improved performance.  A number of papers 
investigate the relation between governance and cash holdings by examining whether the relation 
between firm value and cash holdings varies as a function of governance quality (e.g., Dittmar 
and Mahrt-Smith, 2007; Pinkowitz et al., 2006).  More specifically, these papers examine 
whether variation in the quality of governance is related to variation in the valuation of cash 
holdings (and dividend policy).  These papers generally find that cash holdings (dividend 
payouts) are valued at lower (higher) amounts in countries/firms where governance is poor, 
suggesting that cash holdings are more easily expropriated by managers when governance is 
weak and that dividends help solve this problem.   
We adapt this approach to our setting and investigate two predictions: (a) to the extent 
that cash holdings in Japanese companies are unusually high because of poor governance, we 
expect cash to be valued more highly in U.S. firms than Japanese firms, (b) to the extent that 
governance in Japan improves over time, we expect any such differences to decline from the 
1990s to the 2000s.  We do not examine the relative valuation of dividends in these countries 
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because our earlier evidence indicates that the large majority of Japanese companies pay modest 
dividends, so it is not clear that dividends in Japan are large enough to help resolve agency 
problems.25   
To perform this analysis we follow previous research and use two different regression 
specifications, both of which are based on the approach in Fama and French (1998).  In our case, 
rather than estimating the regressions using panel data, we estimate the regressions by year and 
country because our predictions are about differences between U.S. and Japanese companies and 
how these differences evolve over time.  The first specification follows the cash level 
specification of Pinkowitz et al. (2006):26 
Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + 
β9Di,t + β10dDi,t + β11dDi,t+1 + β12dVi,t + β13Ci,t + εi,t    … (1) 
where dXt denotes changes in X from t-1 to t, V denotes firm value, measured as the market 
value of equity plus the book value of debt, E denotes earnings (EBIT), NA denotes net assets 
(total assets minus cash), RD is research and development expense, D is common dividends, and 
C is cash holdings.  Our focus in this regression is on β13, which we expect to be smaller for 
Japanese firms than U.S. firms, and to increase for Japanese firms as governance improves over 
the sample period.  Because this specification requires one year lead values, we can only 
estimate (1) through 2007. 
The second specification follows Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007): 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Consistent with this, our Table 4 regressions show that while cash holdings are negatively related to dividend 
payment for U.S. firms, implying that dividend-payers tend to hold less cash (in part because they are better 
governed and pay dividends), the opposite holds for Japanese firms, implying that dividends in these firms are 
generally too small to help resolve agency problems.   26	  This is what Pinkowitz et al. (2006) refer to as their “level of cash” specification.  They also use a “change in 
cash” specification.  We have also estimated a version of their changes specification with similar results to those of 
the specifications discussed in the text. 
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Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+2 + β4RDi,t + β5dRDi,t + β6dRDi,t+2 + β7Di,t + β8dDi,t + 
β9dDi,t+2 + β10dNAi,t + β11dNAi,t+2 + β12dVi,t+2 + β13Ci,t + εi,t   … (2) 
Here, all variables are deflated by NAt, and dXi,t denotes changes in X from t-2 to t.  Thus, this 
specification requires an extra lead year of data relative to (1), which means we can only 
estimate (2) through 2006. Our focus is again on β13 for which we have the same expectations as 
for (1).  We use cash in this specification rather than excess cash because, as discussed in Section 
3, the fit of our cash model varies over time and between countries, which would then affect 
inferences from this model (i.e., there would be systematically more measurement error in the 
excess cash variable for Japanese firms in the 1990s, clouding interpretation of trends in 
coefficients on excess cash in the value regressions). 
We report the results of these analyses in Table 8.  To economize on the numbers in 
tables, we report only the cash coefficients (with robust t-statistics) on cash for U.S. and 
Japanese firms, along with tests for differences between these coefficients by year.  The first two 
columns report the cash coefficients from model (1) above; these numbers are also plotted in 
Figure 7.  For U.S. firms, the coefficients move around over time but are reliably positive at the 
1% level or better in 15 of 18 years, and vary in roughly the 1 to 3 range over the sample period 
without any obvious trend.  In contrast, the coefficients for Japanese firms during the 1990s are 
smaller than 1 and in most cases not significantly different from 0.27  Moreover, differences 
between the coefficients for U.S. and Japanese firms are statistically significant (with those for 
U.S. firms reliably larger) for all but two years over 1990 to 1999.  Overall, these numbers 
support our view that Japanese firms were less well-governed than U.S. firms in the 1990s and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 When the coefficients are significantly different from zero, they are also reliably less than 1; for example, the 
coefficients for 1993, 1994, and 1995 are 0.53 (t = 4.31), 0.28 (t = 2.38), and 0.34 (t = 3.21). 
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that this results in investors pricing the cash holdings of Japanese firms at a discount to those of 
U.S. firms. 
Beginning in 2000, coefficients for the Japanese firms increase to around 1 or more, and 
are consistently reliably greater than 1.  Moreover, the coefficients for U.S. firms are no longer 
consistently higher than those of Japanese firms (coefficients for U.S. firms are significantly 
higher than those of Japanese firms in 2000, 2003, and 2006; differences are insignificant in 
2001, 2002, 2004, and 2007; the difference is significantly larger for Japanese firms in 2005).  
This evidence suggests that the governance of Japanese firms improves from the 1990s to the 
2000s to levels comparable to those of U.S. firms. 
The next two columns of Table 8 report cash coefficients from our estimations of (2) (the 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith model).  The overall conclusions here are similar to those from the first 
specification: the coefficients on cash tend to be higher for U.S. firms than Japanese firms, with a 
discernible upward trend for Japanese firms beginning around 1997 (see Figure 8).  For U.S. 
firms, the coefficients vary between 1.52 (t = 4.68) and 3.77 (t = 7.27) over 1990 to 1997, but 
then show some tendency to increase, with numbers of 4 or larger in 1998 and 1999 and 2004 to 
2006.  For Japanese firms, the numbers vary from 0.51 (t = 3.63) to 1.69 (t = 8.25) over the 
1990s, numbers that are significantly lower (at 5% or better) than those for U.S. firms in 7 of 10 
years.  The numbers for Japanese firms are generally higher in the 2000s, with values between 
2.15 and 2.99 over 2003 to 2006.  Coefficients for U.S. firms are significantly higher than for 
Japanese firms in 3 of 7 years over 2000-2006, with the magnitude of the differences in favor of 
U.S. firms but by smaller amounts than in the 1990s. 
Overall, the evidence from these regressions is largely consistent with our predictions: 
the valuation of the cash of Japanese firms is low during the 1990s, both in absolute terms and 
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relative to that of U.S. firms, but improves in the 2000s, to levels comparable to those of U.S. 
firms.  (We have also examined whether these results different for keiretsu and non-keiretsu 
Japanese firms, but find little evidence of consistent or reliable differences.)  This complements 
the evidence from Section 3, where we find that Japanese firms’ management of cash changes 
systematically from the 1990s to the 2000s, to more closely resemble how U.S. firms manage 
cash, and that improvements in Japanese firms’ management of excess cash are associated with 
improvements in performance.   
5. Summary 
We investigate whether the governance practices of Japanese companies, as manifested in 
their holdings of cash, have improved over the past two decades, and whether any such 
improvements translate into improved economic performance.  We find that, in general, some of 
the differences between Japanese and U.S. companies that were evident during the 1990s have 
become less pronounced over the past 10 years but that important differences remain.  While 
overall levels of cash holdings are now roughly the same for U.S. and Japanese companies, when 
we condition on firm characteristics we find that Japanese firms still hold substantially more cash 
than U.S. firms.  We do find, however, that regressions of the determinants of firms’ cash 
holdings developed using U.S. data (Opler et al., 1999; Bates et al., 2009) fit Japanese firms 
better in the 2000s than in the 1990s, suggesting that Japanese managers now pay more attention 
to the economic determinants of their firms’ cash holdings, consistent with improved 
governance. 
Although the large majority of Japanese companies continue to pay dividends, and the 
size of those dividends has increased for some Japanese firms, dividends paid by the median 
Japanese firm are still about half as large as those of the median U.S. dividend payer.  However, 
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some Japanese firms now supplement dividends with share repurchases, and these firms’ payouts 
are substantial in economic terms, measuring about 2% of assets and over half of earnings.  
Overall, aggregate payouts by Japanese firms increase impressively over the period from 1999 
through 2008, an increase that is driven largely by those firms that pay both dividends and 
repurchases.   
We find mixed evidence on whether the cash management practices of Japanese firms 
have improved over time, perhaps because governance has improved for some firms but not 
others.  Consistent with this, we find that levels of excess cash display greater persistence for 
Japanese firms than U.S. firms, and that this tendency is stronger for high levels of excess cash, 
which we associate with poor governance.  Further, and consistent with the idea that 
improvements in governance manifest themselves in lower holdings of cash, we find an inverse 
relation between the (excess) cash holdings of Japanese firms and changes in their performance.  
This result does not hold for U.S. firms, which we argue are generally better governed.  Further, 
we find that the valuations of cash holdings for Japanese firms were systematically lower than 
those of U.S. firms in the 1990s, consistent with the idea that these firms were, on average, 
poorly governed during this period.  The valuation of cash holdings of Japanese firms increases 
from the 1990s to the 2000s, to levels comparable to those of U.S. firms, consistent with an 
improvement in governance.   
Overall, our findings support two conclusions.  First, there is mixed evidence on whether 
governance practices in the average Japanese firm improve over the last 10 years, at least as 
manifested in their management of cash holdings.  However, there is evidence that some 
Japanese firms—those that pay both dividends and repurchases—now distribute substantial 
amounts of cash to shareholders on a regular basis, which is a positive sign for governance.  
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Second, those Japanese firms that are able to improve their management of cash enjoy both an 
improvement in performance and improved valuation of cash holdings.  This evidence generally 
then supports the ideas that there has been some improvement in the governance practices of 
Japanese companies and that this translates into improved performance.  This evidence offers 
hope that further improvements in the governance of Japanese companies will improve corporate 
performance and perhaps stimulate overall economic performance in Japan. 
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Appendix: Repurchases in Japan: Institutional details and measurement 
Repurchases in the U.S. 
In the U.S., repurchases are conventionally measured using the approach used by Fama and 
French (2001) and Skinner (2008).  Under this approach, repurchases are measured net, after 
subtracting from share purchases shares issued for employee stock option programs, acquisitions, 
and for other corporate purposes.  Measurement is complicated by the fact that repurchases may 
be accounted for in either of two ways, the “treasury stock” method (under which the 
repurchased shares are held in treasury until they are reissued) or the “permanent retirement” 
method (under which the outstanding shares are permanently retired, with a corresponding 
reduction in paid-in capital).   
Based on this accounting, repurchases by U.S. firms are measured as the increase in 
common treasury stock if the firm uses the treasury stock method for repurchases.  If the firm 
uses the “retirement” method instead (inferred from the fact that the treasury stock is zero in the 
current and prior year), repurchases are measured as the difference between stock purchases and 
stock issuances from the cash flow statement.  If either of these amounts (the change in treasury 
stock or the difference between stock purchases and issuances) is negative or missing, 
repurchases are set to zero.  
Researchers using U.S. data implement this method using Compustat data.  Because we 
use WorldScope data for U.S. firms and because WorldScope data does not separate purchases 
and sales of common and preferred stock, using the method above for U.S. firms from 
WorldScope data systematically overstates measured repurchases relative to Compustat.  
Consequently, we do not report repurchases for U.S. firms.   
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The emergence of Repurchases in Japan  
Beginning in 1994, Japan has gradually lifted restrictions on firms’ ability to repurchase shares.  
In 1994, Japan modified the law to allow repurchases but only by permanently retiring shares 
using retained earnings.  However, because of uncertainty about the tax treatment of such 
retirements, managers didn’t actually use this method until November 1995.28   
The special law for stock retirement in June 1997 further liberalized the rules for stock 
repurchases by removing restrictions over their timing.  Under the 1994 regime, firms could only 
consider plans to make repurchases once a year, at the annual regular shareholders’ meeting, and 
these plans were subject to shareholder approval.  Under the special law, once managers obtained 
approval from shareholders to set up a maximum amount and number of shares for repurchases 
in the corporate articles, managers could then make repurchases decisions (amount and timing) 
without shareholder approval.  The subsequent amendment of this special law in 1998 and the 
enactment of the law for evaluation of land in 1999 expanded the components of shareholders’ 
equity that were available to fund repurchases: the former included legal capital surplus; the 
latter added revaluation reserves from land.29  Related laws also liberalized firms’ ability to make 
repurchased shares available for management incentive compensation, including stock options. 
The 2001 modified Commercial Code further expanded firms’ ability to make 
repurchases. First, for the first time the treasury stock method was permitted.  Second, minimum 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 The Japanese Tax Code treats repurchases as a return of net assets to shareholders, that is, the payment is a 
combination of contributed capital and retained earnings.  Similar to the tax treatment of dividends, the Tax Code 
could recognize that part of the payout corresponding to retained earnings as taxable income.  As a result, 
shareholders receiving cash from such repurchases would pay both capital gains and income taxes, effectively being 
taxed twice.  Because of this treatment, in June 1995, the Japanese tax office announced its intention to exclude 
repurchases by listed firms from dividend taxation.  The corresponding amendment of the Tax Code was enacted in 
November 1995. 
29 In general, Japanese law (Commercial Code) has very detailed restrictions regarding firms’ ability to make 
dividends and repurchases that are based on various components of shareholders’ equity.  These restrictions are 
similar in spirit to corporate laws in U.S. states, as well as debt covenants in loan agreements, that typically restrict 
firms’ ability to pay dividends to retained earnings or some fraction thereof.  The difference is that Japanese legal 
and accounting practices mean that Japanese firms have numerous categories of capital, retained earnings, and 
reserves within shareholders’ equity on the balance sheet.	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capital restrictions over firms’ ability to pay out cash as either dividends or repurchases were 
relaxed.  Under the previous law, firms with insufficient capital needed to increase legal retained 
earnings before making payouts.  Under the modified law, firms for which the sum of legal 
retained earnings and legal capital surplus, instead of legal retained earnings alone, exceeded one 
quarter of capital stock were exempt from this requirement.  Third, firms that met the above 
capital requirements could reduce the excess portion of the legal capital surplus and add it to 
retained earnings. Previously reduction in legal capital surplus was admitted either to offset loss 
carry forwards or to increase in capital stock. 
Finally, further legal changes in 2006 effectively lifted all remaining restrictions on 
managers’ ability to return cash to shareholders, including repurchases. 
Most of the data we use for the study are from Worldscope.  However, Worldscope does 
not separate purchases and sales of common and preferred stock, so using the method described 
above to measure repurchases would systematically overstates repurchases by including changes 
in preferred stock and failing to net out common stock issuances.  Consequently, we measure 
repurchases for Japanese firms using the method outlined above and data from Nikkei Quick, 
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Table	  1:	  Comparison	  of	  cash	  holdings,	  valuation	  metrics,	  and	  profitability	  of	  Japanese	  and	  U.S.	  non-­‐financial	  firms,	  
1990-­‐2008	  	  	   Cash/Total	  Assets	   Market/Book	   P/E	   EBIT/lagged	  TA	  	   US	   Japan	   US	   Japan	   US	   Japan	   US	   Japan	  	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1990	   0.069	   0.028	   0.160	   0.138	   2.15	   1.31	   4.64	   3.45	   21.0	   13.6	   79.9	   50.1	   0.114	   0.111	   0.079	   0.071	  1991	   0.081	   0.040	   0.146	   0.124	   2.99	   1.75	   3.66	   2.82	   35.9	   19.7	   64.6	   40.8	   0.095	   0.093	   0.078	   0.070	  1992	   0.086	   0.049	   0.136	   0.113	   3.08	   2.00	   2.42	   1.92	   31.9	   20.5	   62.9	   35.9	   0.091	   0.092	   0.064	   0.058	  1993	   0.085	   0.049	   0.126	   0.107	   3.19	   2.21	   2.29	   1.81	   36.4	   20.9	   76.7	   42.4	   0.088	   0.094	   0.047	   0.044	  1994	   0.098	   0.054	   0.128	   0.107	   3.00	   2.02	   2.61	   1.97	   28.1	   16.8	   93.4	   51.1	   0.106	   0.110	   0.041	   0.037	  1995	   0.110	   0.059	   0.125	   0.104	   3.62	   2.39	   2.21	   1.67	   33.4	   18.7	   74.2	   39.9	   0.101	   0.113	   0.043	   0.038	  1996	   0.123	   0.068	   0.115	   0.095	   3.72	   2.44	   2.57	   1.94	   35.9	   20.4	   75.7	   41.2	   0.089	   0.112	   0.045	   0.039	  1997	   0.125	   0.071	   0.107	   0.085	   3.82	   2.56	   1.93	   1.40	   37.5	   21.4	   52.2	   31.2	   0.055	   0.105	   0.045	   0.039	  1998	   0.136	   0.068	   0.110	   0.087	   3.81	   2.07	   1.69	   1.00	   38.1	   19.8	   50.2	   24.7	   0.020	   0.091	   0.038	   0.032	  1999	   0.153	   0.063	   0.120	   0.096	   5.02	   2.19	   2.06	   1.01	   42.6	   18.4	   55.8	   28.4	   -­‐0.001	   0.078	   0.036	   0.029	  2000	   0.142	   0.069	   0.131	   0.102	   3.45	   1.72	   2.17	   1.00	   33.6	   16.1	   50.9	   23.4	   0.009	   0.077	   0.040	   0.033	  2001	   0.143	   0.072	   0.135	   0.104	   3.42	   1.93	   1.86	   1.00	   44.5	   23.2	   37.3	   20.3	   -­‐0.024	   0.046	   0.040	   0.033	  2002	   0.144	   0.079	   0.151	   0.113	   2.75	   1.50	   1.63	   1.00	   29.6	   17.4	   43.9	   20.0	   -­‐0.009	   0.050	   0.032	   0.026	  2003	   0.169	   0.099	   0.158	   0.119	   3.83	   2.34	   1.57	   1.00	   38.8	   23.3	   35.1	   17.1	   0.013	   0.061	   0.048	   0.034	  2004	   0.157	   0.096	   0.161	   0.117	   3.81	   2.55	   2.31	   1.15	   38.6	   22.8	   37.5	   20.7	   0.033	   0.080	   0.064	   0.048	  2005	   0.160	   0.096	   0.160	   0.120	   3.68	   2.47	   2.38	   1.33	   36.1	   21.4	   38.6	   20.5	   0.034	   0.082	   0.069	   0.054	  2006	   0.163	   0.095	   0.150	   0.114	   3.75	   2.54	   2.50	   1.58	   36.5	   21.5	   38.7	   23.5	   0.038	   0.085	   0.064	   0.057	  2007	   0.174	   0.106	   0.142	   0.112	   3.55	   2.25	   1.83	   1.25	   34.4	   20.0	   31.6	   18.1	   0.036	   0.083	   0.060	   0.058	  2008	   0.174	   0.109	   0.139	   0.108	   2.24	   1.19	   1.43	   1.00	   22.0	   13.3	   25.5	   13.4	   -­‐0.006	   0.056	   0.048	   0.048	  Total	   0.139	   0.075	   0.137	   0.108	   3.50	   2.11	   2.18	   1.32	   35.0	   19.7	   49.4	   25.6	   0.038	   0.084	   0.051	   0.044	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All	  data	  are	  from	  Worldscope.	  	  Years	  correspond	  to	  fiscal	  years	  (for	  example,	  for	  Japanese	  firms	  fiscal	  year-­‐ends	  from	  1.16.91	  through	  1.15.92	  are	  classified	  as	  1991,	  a	  fiscal	  year-­‐end	  of	  March	  31,	  1991	  is	  thus	  classified	  as	  1991;	  for	  U.S.	  firms	  the	  cut-­‐off	  is	  February	  10).	  	  Italics	  for	  Japanese	  numbers	  indicate	  that	  US	  versus	  Japan	  difference	  is	  significant	  at	  5%	  level	  or	  better.	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Table	  2:	  Size	  and	  profitability	  of	  Japanese	  industrials	  classified	  according	  to	  payout	  policy,	  1998-­‐2008:	  (i)	  non-­‐payers,	  
(ii)	  firms	  that	  only	  pay	  dividends,	  (iii)	  firms	  that	  pay	  dividends	  and	  repurchases.	  
	  
	   Size	  (total	  assets),	  yen	  millions	   	   Profitability	  (EBIT/TA),	  %	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Non-­‐payers	   Dividend-­‐only	   Dividend-­‐repurchase	   	   Non-­‐payers	   Dividend-­‐only	   Dividend-­‐repurchase	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	   Mean	   Med.	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1998	   95,332	   25,319	   183,351	   35,592	   419,911	   49,015	   	   -­‐0.7	   0.7	   4.7	   3.9	   4.1	   3.6	  1999	   155,671	   27,670	   162,604	   36,738	   226,757	   50,350	   	   -­‐3.1	   -­‐1.4	   4.8	   3.8	   3.4	   3.2	  2000	   164,762	   29,337	   161,232	   32,419	   203,258	   60,276	   	   -­‐2.8	   0.4	   5.1	   4.1	   3.6	   3.5	  2001	   149,751	   23,104	   161,331	   31,876	   199,522	   58,846	   	   -­‐1.1	   0.3	   5.1	   4.4	   3.3	   3.2	  2002	   117,782	   20,604	   153,752	   27,937	   215,248	   54,667	   	   -­‐3.7	   -­‐1.0	   4.5	   3.7	   3.0	   2.7	  2003	   98,167	   16,277	   137,464	   26,480	   199,768	   58,846	   	   -­‐0.8	   1.3	   5.3	   4.6	   4.4	   3.5	  2004	   92,239	   15,020	   141,069	   27,821	   229,955	   47,063	   	   -­‐0.4	   2.5	   6.4	   5.2	   5.5	   4.7	  2005	   69,429	   12,891	   136,491	   29,340	   328,301	   48,332	   	   0.8	   2.7	   6.5	   5.5	   6.2	   5.5	  2006	   61,850	   12,304	   160,371	   31,900	   349,450	   57,099	   	   -­‐1.9	   1.4	   6.3	   5.7	   6.8	   6.2	  2007	   54,915	   10,960	   171,762	   34,164	   370,696	   50,786	   	   -­‐5.0	   1.0	   6.7	   6.0	   7.2	   6.3	  2008	   42,891	   9,557	   182,619	   34,963	   301,021	   44,990	   	   -­‐10.5	   -­‐1.1	   6.0	   5.1	   6.9	   6.4	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Table	  reports	  size	  (total	  assets,	  in	  millions	  of	  yen)	  and	  profitability	  (EBIT/TA,	  %)	  for	  Japanese	  industrials	  divided	  into	  three	  groups	  of	  firms:	  (a)	  firms	  that	  do	  not	  pay	  dividends	  or	  make	  repurchases	  in	  year	  (non-­‐payers),	  (b)	  firms	  that	  pay	  dividends	  but	  do	  not	  make	  repurchases	  in	  a	  given	  year	  (dividend-­‐only	  firms),	  and	  (c)	  firms	  that	  pay	  dividends	  and	  make	  repurchases	  in	  a	  given	  year	  (dividend-­‐repurchase	  firms).	  	  Italics	  indicate	  that	  dividend-­‐repurchase	  (dividend-­‐only)	  firms	  are	  significantly	  
different	  from	  dividend-­‐only	  (non-­‐payer)	  firms	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  Bold	  indicates	  that	  numbers	  for	  dividend-­‐repurchase	  firms	  
are	  significantly	  different	  from	  numbers	  for	  non-­‐payers	  firms	  at	  the	  1%	  level.	  	  All	  data	  from	  Worldscope.	  	  Years	  correspond	  to	  fiscal	  years	  (for	  example,	  for	  Japanese	  firms	  fiscal	  year-­‐ends	  from	  1.16.91	  through	  1.15.92	  are	  classified	  as	  1991,	  a	  fiscal	  year-­‐end	  of	  March	  31,	  1991	  is	  thus	  classified	  as	  1991;	  for	  U.S.	  firms	  the	  cut-­‐off	  is	  February	  10).	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Table	  3:	  Total	  payouts	  (dividends	  plus	  repurchases)	  ratios	  for	  Japanese	  non-­‐financial	  firms	  that	  pay	  only	  dividends	  
versus	  those	  that	  pay	  both	  dividends	  and	  repurchases,	  1998-­‐2008	  
	  
	   Total	  payout/Total	  assets	  (%)	   	   Total	  payout/Net	  income	  (%)	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Dividend-­‐only	  firms	   Dividend-­‐repurchase	  firms	   	   Dividend-­‐only	  firms	   Dividend-­‐repurchase	  firms	  
	   Mean	   Median	   Mean	  	   Median	   	   Mean	   Median	   Mean	   Median	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  1998	   0.7	   0.6	   2.5	   1.8	   	   70.2	   28.8	   178	   85.2	  1999	   0.8	   0.6	   1.8	   1.4	   	   79.9	   27.4	   184	   70.5	  2000	   0.8	   0.6	   1.9	   1.5	   	   71.9	   21.2	   143	   66.6	  2001	   0.7	   0.6	   3.9	   1.4	   	   48.7	   19.8	   938	   61.6	  2002	   0.8	   0.6	   2.2	   1.5	   	   58.8	   21.6	   117	   62.8	  2003	   0.7	   0.6	   2.2	   1.5	   	   48.8	   21.6	   118	   64.7	  2004	   0.8	   0.6	   2.1	   1.4	   	   31.0	   20.7	   78.7	   57.8	  2005	   0.9	   0.7	   2.6	   1.6	   	   35.8	   20.1	   142	   48.7	  2006	   0.9	   0.7	   3.3	   2.0	   	   218	   20.9	   104	   52.9	  2007	   1.0	   0.8	   3.3	   2.0	   	   37.1	   22.6	   162	   57.3	  2008	   1.1	   0.8	   3.2	   2.2	   	   47.6	   25.7	   105	   59.2	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  Dividend-­‐only	  firms	  are	  those	  that	  only	  pay	  dividends	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  	  Dividend-­‐repurchase	  firms	  are	  firms	  that	  pay	  both	  dividends	  and	  repurchases	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  	  Total	  payout	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  dividends	  and	  repurchases	  in	  a	  given	  year.	  	  Data	  are	  from	  Worldscope	  except	  for	  repurchases	  which	  are	  from	  Nikkei	  Quick	  and	  individual	  firm	  financial	  statements.	  	  Years	  correspond	  to	  fiscal	  years	  (for	  example,	  fiscal	  year	  ends	  from	  1.16.91	  through	  1.15.92	  are	  classified	  as	  1991).	  	  All	  differences	  for	  both	  variables	  are	  statistically	  significant	  at	  the	  1%	  level	  or	  better	  under	  two-­‐tailed	  tests.	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Table	  4:	  OLS	  regressions	  of	  firms’	  cash	  holdings	  (cash/ta)	  on	  set	  of	  predicted	  determinants	  for	  U.S.	  
and	  Japanese	  industrial	  firms	  with	  available	  data	  over	  1990-­‐2008.	  
	  	   U.S.:	  	  1990-­‐2008	   U.S.:	  	  1990-­‐1999	   U.S.:	  	  2000-­‐2008	   Japan:	  1990-­‐2008	   Japan:	  1990-­‐1999	   Japan:	  2000-­‐2008	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Int.	   0.242	  (21.3)	   0.180	  (11.3)	   0.273	  (23.0)	   0.227	  (2.11)	   0.097	  (2.11)	   0.248	  (9.11)	  Year	  2000-­‐2003	   0.015	  (3.66)	   	   	   -­‐0.13	  (-­‐1.47)	   	   	  Year	  2004-­‐2008	   0.017	  (3.64)	   	   	   -­‐.020	  (-­‐2.18)	   	   	  Size	   -­‐0.013	  (-­‐9.88)	   -­‐0.010	  (-­‐7.85)	   -­‐0.014	  (-­‐8.34)	   -­‐0.012	  (-­‐4.60)	   0.001	  (0.17)	   -­‐0.015	  (-­‐6.50)	  Div.	  pay	  dummy	   -­‐.037	  (-­‐8.46)	   -­‐0.038	  (-­‐7.26)	   -­‐0.033	  (-­‐5.39)	   0.019	  (3.46)	   0.026	  (4.07)	   0.015	  (2.42)	  Leverage	   -­‐0.172	  (-­‐19.5)	   -­‐0.164	  (-­‐12.7)	   -­‐0.170	  (-­‐15.0)	   -­‐0.128	  (-­‐4.75)	   -­‐0.055	  (-­‐1.07)	   -­‐0.156	  (-­‐5.69)	  ROE	   0.016	  (2.16)	   0.008	  (1.04)	   0.019	  (1.73)	   0.019	  (1.89)	   0.052	  (2.16)	   0.010	  (1.10)	  Loss	  dummy	   -­‐0.007	  (-­‐1.65)	   -­‐0.006	  (-­‐1.55)	   -­‐0.007	  (-­‐1.20)	   0.001	  (0.39)	   0.002	  (0.20)	   0.003	  (0.73)	  Market/Book	   0.002	  (5.08)	   0.003	  (4.81)	   0.002	  (3.63)	   0.007	  (4.83)	   0.002	  (1.40)	   0.008	  (5.06)	  Closely	  held	   -­‐0.003	  (-­‐0.30)	   -­‐0.004	  (-­‐0.36)	   0.002	  (0.20)	   0.032	  (2.67)	   0.027	  (1.10)	   0.034	  (2.76)	  Ind.	  Sigma	   0.177	  (5.25)	   0.567	  (5.48)	   0.159	  (5.88)	   0.812	  (4.62)	   -­‐0.141	  (-­‐0.38)	   0.796	  (4.54)	  Net	  WC	   -­‐0.228	  (-­‐17.1)	   -­‐0.177	  (-­‐8.22)	   -­‐0.258	  (-­‐21.0)	   -­‐0.070	  (-­‐4.34)	   -­‐0.034	  (-­‐1.24)	   -­‐0.080	  (-­‐4.88)	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R&D	   0.208	  (16.3)	   0.176	  (10.3)	   0.221	  (14.4)	   0.514	  (10.20)	   0.317	  (2.26)	   0.517	  (9.26)	  Capex	   -­‐0.345	  (-­‐11.0)	   -­‐0.306	  (-­‐6.75)	   -­‐0.367	  (-­‐9.20)	   -­‐0.557	  (-­‐7.67)	   -­‐0.444	  (-­‐3.10)	   -­‐0.591	  (-­‐7.54)	  Cash	  Flow	   0.073	  (6.12)	   0.076	  (5.39)	   0.074	  (4.60)	   0.273	  (5.95)	   0.227	  (1.31)	   0.288	  (6.01)	  
Keiretsu	  dummy	   na	   na	   na	   -­‐0.028	  (-­‐6.72)	   -­‐0.031	  (-­‐4.27)	   -­‐0.027	  (-­‐6.38)	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Obs.	   22,095	   9,684	   12,411	   12,736	   2,779	   9,957	  Adj.	  R-­‐square	   0.331	   0.305	   0.320	   0.223	   0.114	   0.254	  	  We	  measure	  size	  as	  the	  natural	  log	  of	  total	  assets,	  leverage	  as	  the	  ratio	  of	  long-­‐term	  debt	  to	  total	  assets,	  ROE	  as	  net	  income	  deflated	  by	  lagged	  stockholders’	  equity,	  net	  working	  capital	  as	  current	  assets	  minus	  current	  liabilities	  minus	  cash	  deflated	  by	  total	  assets,	  R&D	  as	  research	  and	  development	  expenditures	  deflated	  by	  sales,	  capital	  expenditures	  as	  capital	  expenditures	  deflated	  by	  total	  assets,	  and	  cash	  flow	  as	  funds	  from	  operations	  deflated	  by	  total	  assets.	  	  The	  dividend-­‐payer	  dummy	  is	  set	  to	  1	  for	  dividend-­‐payers	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  	  The	  loss	  dummy	  is	  set	  to	  1	  for	  firms	  with	  negative	  net	  income	  and	  0	  otherwise.	  	  Closely	  held	  is	  the	  fraction	  of	  shares	  held	  by	  insiders;	  in	  Japan,	  it	  is	  measured	  as	  the	  fraction	  of	  shares	  held	  by	  the	  ten	  largest	  shareholders.	  	  We	  construct	  industry	  sigma	  as	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  standard	  deviations	  of	  cash	  flow/assets	  over	  the	  past	  10	  years	  for	  firms	  in	  a	  given	  industry.	  	  We	  define	  industry	  by	  using	  industry	  group	  variable	  (WC06011)	  from	  WorldScope.	  	  We	  use	  three-­‐digit	  code	  for	  miscellaneous	  industry	  and	  two-­‐digit	  code	  for	  all	  other	  industries.	  	  Due	  to	  the	  requirement	  of	  cash	  flow	  data	  in	  the	  past	  10	  years,	  industry	  sigma	  could	  not	  be	  calculated	  for	  observations	  before	  1990.	  	  The	  keiretsu	  dummy	  is	  set	  to	  1	  for	  firms	  with	  relatively	  high	  inclination	  to	  the	  largest	  six	  horizontal	  “enterprise”	  groups	  in	  Japan,	  measured	  in	  2001,	  and	  sourced	  from	  Industrial	  Groupings	  in	  Japan	  (2001);	  see	  text	  for	  more	  detail.	  	  We	  report	  t-­‐statistics	  in	  parentheses	  (standard	  errors	  are	  computed	  after	  clustering	  by	  firm	  and	  year).	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Table	  5:	  Selected	  summary	  statistics	  from	  annual	  cross-­‐sectional	  regressions	  explaining	  U.S.	  and	  Japanese	  
firms’	  cash	  holdings	  
	  	   Obs.	   Adj.	  R-­‐squared	   Japan	  intercept	  dummy	  (t-­‐stat)	   Keiretsu	  intercept	  dummy	  (t-­‐stat)	  	   	   	   	   	  1990	   934	   0.255	   0.145	  (8.02)	   -­‐0.035	  (-­‐2.42)	  1991	   916	   0.285	   0.164	  (9.44)	   -­‐0.045	  (-­‐3.31)	  1992	   926	   0.274	   0.190	  (10.7)	   -­‐0.045	  (-­‐3.40)	  1993	   997	   0.237	   0.170	  (10.5)	   -­‐0.046	  (-­‐3.71)	  1994	   996	   0.335	   0.181	  (10.3)	   -­‐0.044	  (-­‐3.37)	  1995	   1,184	   0.321	   0.150	  (8.46)	   -­‐0.055	  (-­‐3.96)	  1996	   1,550	   0.264	   0.097	  (6.44)	   -­‐0.028	  (-­‐2.96)	  1997	   1,652	   0.224	   0.094	  (6.46)	   -­‐0.024	  (-­‐2.39)	  1998	   1,667	   0.252	   0.101	  (6.45)	   -­‐0.020	  (-­‐1.90)	  1999	   1,697	   0.293	   0.063	  (3.83)	   -­‐0.022	  (-­‐1.80)	  2000	   2,094	   0.278	   0.069	  (4.77)	   -­‐0.027	  (-­‐2.93)	  2001	   2,257	   0.233	   0.035	  (2.57)	   -­‐0.033	  (-­‐3.68)	  2002	   2,509	   0.206	   0.089	  (7.35)	   -­‐0.039	  (-­‐4.80)	  2003	   2,534	   0.278	   0.113	  (9.13)	   -­‐0.048	  (-­‐5.69)	  2004	   2,878	   0.269	   0.116	  (10.4)	   -­‐0.046	  (-­‐5.58)	  2005	   2,931	   0.287	   0.123	  (11.0)	   -­‐0.048	  (-­‐5.85)	  2006	   2,685	   0.332	   0.112	  (10.3)	   -­‐0.040	  (-­‐5.21)	  2007	   2,437	   0.340	   0.111	  (9.61)	   -­‐0.041	  (-­‐5.18)	  2008	   2,285	   0.322	   0.084	  (6.95)	   -­‐0.038	  (-­‐4.75)	  	   	   	   	   	  The	  table	  reports	  selected	  summary	  statistics	  from	  regressions	  of	  cash	  holdings	  on	  firm	  characteristics	  for	  Japanese	  and	  U.S.	  firms.	  	  These	  regressions	  are	  estimated	  as	  annual	  cross-­‐sections	  for	  all	  U.S.	  and	  Japanese	  firms	  with	  available	  data.	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  is	  cash/total	  assets.	  	  Independent	  variables	  are	  the	  Japan	  intercept	  dummy	  (set	  to	  one	  for	  Japanese	  firms	  and	  zero	  for	  U.S.	  firms),	  size,	  dividend-­‐payer	  dummy,	  leverage,	  ROE,	  a	  loss	  dummy,	  market-­‐to-­‐book,	  the	  percentage	  of	  closely	  held	  shares,	  industry	  sigma,	  net	  working	  capital,	  R&D,	  capital	  expenditures,	  and	  cash	  flow.	  	  For	  more	  detailed	  definitions,	  see	  Table	  2	  notes.	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Table 6: Transition matrices showing changes in firms’ holding of excess cash, where firms are sorted into excess cash 
deciles at the beginning and end of three periods (1994-1999, 1999-2004, 2004-2008) and tables show transitions 
between excess cash deciles during these periods.	  
 
Panel A: U.S. Firms 
 
U.S. Firms, 1994-1999 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 79 17.07 29.27 17.07 7.32 4.88 9.76 2.44 2.44 9.76 0.00 
2 81 8.82 2.94 23.53 23.53 11.76 5.88 8.82 2.94 11.76 0.00 
3 80 6.82 6.82 4.55 22.73 11.36 15.91 13.64 9.09 6.82 2.27 
4 80 3.23 16.13 19.35 19.35 22.58 6.45 9.68 3.23 0.00 0.00 
5 80 2.50 5.00 10.00 7.50 20.00 22.50 15.00 10.00 7.50 0.00 
6 80 0.00 0.00 5.26 13.16 18.42 21.05 21.05 10.53 5.26 5.26 
7 80 10.00 12.50 7.50 5.00 2.50 17.50 20.00 10.00 7.50 7.50 
8 80 0.00 0.00 5.26 5.26 21.05 21.05 21.05 10.53 10.53 5.26 
9 80 4.76 7.14 9.52 4.76 2.38 7.14 19.05 26.19 16.67 2.38 
10 81 4.55 2.27 2.27 11.36 15.91 2.27 9.09 18.18 22.73 11.36 
 








Firms that move up 150 -0.3% -0.7% 1.0% 0.0% 
Firms that move down 149 -5.3% -1.8% -6.1% -2.1% 
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U.S. Firms, 1999-2004 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 129 33.33 16.67 15.38 3.85 2.56 3.85 8.97 5.13 7.69 2.56 
2 129 24.39 17.07 17.07 9.76 6.10 6.10 3.66 9.76 2.44 3.66 
3 130 12.70 11.11 20.63 11.11 11.11 7.94 9.52 1.59 4.76 9.52 
4 129 2.99 19.40 11.94 11.94 11.94 8.96 7.46 11.94 7.46 5.97 
5 130 4.35 10.14 7.25 17.39 7.25 14.49 13.04 10.14 10.14 5.80 
6 129 6.49 5.19 11.69 15.58 14.29 15.58 10.39 9.09 5.19 6.49 
7 129 2.53 8.86 2.53 8.86 20.25 17.72 7.59 6.33 12.66 12.66 
8 130 4.55 4.55 4.55 12.12 12.12 13.64 19.70 21.21 3.03 4.55 
9 129 1.30 5.19 7.79 6.49 11.69 6.49 11.69 20.78 18.18 10.39 
10 130 2.78 8.33 8.33 6.94 6.94 5.56 8.33 12.50 12.50 27.78 
 








Firms that move up 238 2.4% -1.6% 3.9% -1.8% 
Firms that move down 289 2.4% -1.5% 2.2% -1.9% 
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U.S. Firms, 2004-2008 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 166 23.88 20.90 8.96 10.45 5.97 2.99 1.49 8.96 7.46 8.96 
2 167 16.00 21.33 13.33 16.00 4.00 4.00 8.00 8.00 4.00 5.33 
3 167 8.99 10.11 21.35 11.24 14.61 5.62 4.49 8.99 6.74 7.87 
4 167 14.81 4.94 9.88 16.05 14.81 4.94 9.88 8.64 12.35 3.70 
5 167 5.62 5.62 11.24 22.47 11.24 12.36 13.48 5.62 4.49 7.87 
6 167 5.95 11.90 5.95 11.90 10.71 14.29 11.90 13.10 10.71 3.57 
7 167 3.70 2.47 11.11 9.88 16.05 13.58 18.52 11.11 8.64 4.94 
8 167 1.23 7.41 6.17 7.41 11.11 12.35 14.81 16.05 14.81 8.64 
9 167 8.00 6.67 8.00 2.67 6.67 17.33 9.33 13.33 17.33 10.67 
10 167 12.16 9.46 0.00 2.70 9.46 9.46 8.11 9.46 13.51 25.68 
 








Firms that move up 283 -3.3% -2.9% -7.8% -4.1% 
Firms that move down 310 -4.8% -2.4% -4.0% -4.5% 
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Panel B: Japanese Firms 
Japanese Firms, 1994-1999 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 19 44.44 11.11 5.56 5.56 11.11 5.56 11.11 5.56 0.00 0.00 
2 20 9.09 27.27 18.18 27.27 9.09 0.00 9.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 19 6.67 20.00 13.33 13.33 0.00 26.67 13.33 0.00 6.67 0.00 
4 20 0.00 12.50 18.75 18.75 12.50 18.75 12.50 6.25 0.00 0.00 
5 19 14.29 14.29 7.14 7.14 28.57 7.14 0.00 14.29 0.00 7.14 
6 20 0.00 15.38 15.38 0.00 15.38 15.38 15.38 7.69 7.69 7.69 
7 19 0.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 0.00 25.00 31.25 25.00 6.25 0.00 
8 20 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.50 12.50 0.00 12.50 12.50 37.50 12.50 
9 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 9.09 0.00 0.00 27.27 36.36 18.18 
10 20 0.00 0.00 9.09 0.00 0.00 9.09 9.09 9.09 54.55 9.09 
 
 








Firms that move up 53 -2.2% -2.2% -9.3% -3.8% 
Firms that move down 45 -0.9% -0.6% -0.5% -1.0% 















	   56	  
Japanese Firms, 1999-2004 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 40 28.13 21.88 18.75 6.25 9.38 9.38 3.13 3.13 0.00 0.00 
2 40 14.71 14.71 23.53 26.47 2.94 5.88 5.88 2.94 2.94 0.00 
3 40 8.82 8.82 11.76 14.71 26.47 8.82 2.94 11.76 2.94 2.94 
4 41 12.12 21.21 12.12 9.09 12.12 21.21 3.03 6.06 3.03 0.00 
5 40 2.94 14.71 5.88 26.47 17.65 14.71 8.82 2.94 2.94 2.94 
6 40 11.11 5.56 13.89 19.44 13.89 8.33 19.44 5.56 2.78 0.00 
7 41 3.13 21.88 12.50 12.50 9.38 9.38 15.63 9.38 6.25 0.00 
8 40 8.82 2.94 8.82 5.88 11.76 5.88 8.82 14.71 23.53 8.82 
9 40 2.78 5.56 11.11 2.78 11.11 2.78 5.56 19.44 33.33 5.56 
10 41 3.03 0.00 3.03 3.03 6.06 6.06 15.15 15.15 12.12 36.36 
 
 








Firms that move up 125 0.6% 1.0% 0.9% 2.7% 
Firms that move down 149 2.4% 2.6% 8.0% 4.1% 
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Japanese Firms, 2004-2008 
 Obs. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 120 53.54 16.16 9.09 4.04 6.06 3.03 3.03 1.01 0.00 4.04 
2 121 24.11 27.68 19.64 10.71 3.57 7.14 2.68 1.79 1.79 0.89 
3 121 4.35 23.48 23.48 17.39 11.30 3.48 6.96 4.35 2.61 2.61 
4 121 7.14 11.61 11.61 18.75 16.07 16.07 9.82 5.36 1.79 1.79 
5 121 4.39 7.02 11.40 13.16 15.79 15.79 9.65 13.16 7.02 2.63 
6 121 3.74 1.87 8.41 11.21 22.43 13.08 14.95 14.95 7.48 1.87 
7 121 2.54 3.39 5.08 11.02 10.17 16.95 20.34 12.71 9.32 8.47 
8 121 1.87 4.67 3.74 5.61 8.41 12.15 16.82 19.63 21.50 5.61 
9 121 2.73 1.82 4.55 4.55 4.55 9.09 10.00 10.00 30.00 22.73 
10 121 1.90 0.95 2.86 2.86 1.90 3.81 3.81 13.33 21.90 46.67 
 
 








Firms that move up 395 -1.4% -0.1% -2.8% -0.7% 
Firms that move down 407  0.4%  0.7% -0.2% 0.1% 




Notes.  For each year (beginning and end of each of the three periods) and each country, observations are sorted into deciles 
based on excess cash.  Excess cash is measured using the residuals from the same type of cash holdings regressions described 
in Table 2, but estimated by country for the full time period and without the time dummies.  The cells of the matrices report 
the number of firms in a given excess cash row/column at the beginning/end of each period, expressed as a percentage of row 
totals.  The tables below each matrix report on changes in ROA and ROE from the beginning to the end of each period for 
firms that move up (down) deciles from the beginning to the end of each period, as well as two-tailed p values for differences 
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Table 7:  OLS regressions of change in firm performance on changes in excess cash deciles, keiretsu membership, and 
interaction term 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change in ROA 
 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2008 Pooled 

































Adjusted R-squared 0.037 0.017 0.009 0.014 
Observations 127 332 1,067 1,526 
     
 
Panel B: Dependent variable is change in ROE 
 1994-1999 1999-2004 2004-2008 Pooled 

































Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.040 0.010 0.021 
Observations 129 333 1,075 1,537 
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Table reports the results from regressions of changes in firm performance (measured as either ROA, EBIT on lagged total 
assets, or ROE, NI on lagged stockholders’ equity) on changes in excess cash decile (from Table 4), a keiretsu dummy 
(measured as in Tables 2 and 3), and an interaction between these variables.  We estimate this regressions for all Japanese 
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Table 8: Cash coefficients (t-statistics) from “value” regressions of firm value on level of cash and other determinants 
estimated annually for Japanese and U.S. industrial firms 
 
 Pinkowitz et al. (2006) specification Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
specification 
 U.S. firms Japanese firms U.S. firms Japanese firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
1990 0.95 (2.67) 0.11 (0.49)*** 1.52 (4.68) 0.68 (4.35)** 
1991 2.58 (3.79) 0.18 (1.13)*** 2.46 (4.62) 0.51 (3.63)*** 
1992 1.59 (2.67) 0.22 (1.75)*** 3.77 (7.27) 1.42 (13.47)*** 
1993 0.91 (1.46) 0.53 (4.31) 1.45 (3.65) 1.16 (11.90) 
1994 0.88 (1.85) 0.28 (2.38) 2.18 (5.63) 1.66 (14.93)* 
1995 3.16 (6.04) 0.34 (3.21)*** 2.96 (5.21) 1.23 (13.80)*** 
1996 1.97 (3.77) -0.13 (-1.04)*** 1.68 (3.72) 1.14 (9.89) 
1997 2.97 (6.84) -0.22 (-1.79)*** 2.87 (6.26) 0.90 (7.92)*** 
1998 3.41 (5.97) -0.02 (-0.17)*** 4.40 (11.20) 1.12 (7.54)*** 
1999 5.54 (7.87) 0.54 (2.22)*** 4.78 (9.58) 1.69 (8.25)*** 
2000 2.43 (4.71) 0.87 (4.05)** 1.75 (5.05) 1.34 (9.54) 
2001 0.80 (1.70) 0.74 (3.41) 2.56 (7.44) 1.60 (9.54) 
2002 1.21 (3.18) 1.17 (6.37) 2.35 (7.30) 1.89 (12.03) 
2003 1.86 (5.52) 1.02 (7.15)** 3.00 (12.66) 2.15 (15.04)* 
2004 3.35 (9.84) 2.83 (16.82) 4.67 (18.95) 2.83 (20.94)*** 
2005  2.17 (7.01) 3.01 (18.71)** 3.62 (20.92) 2.99 (25.20)** 
2006 2.89 (8.80) 1.61 (11.55)*** 3.92 (19.75) 2.47 (21.55)*** 
2007 1.37 (4.35) 1.68 (12.00) na na 
     
 
*(**)(***) Denotes statistically significant difference between U.S. and Japanese firms at the 10%(5%)(1%) level, two-tailed. 
The table reports coefficients on the cash variable (C) in the following regression specifications.  Columns (1) and (2) report the 
estimated cash coefficients (β13) from the following regressions for US and Japanese firms, respectively, by year: 
Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+1 + β4dNAi,t + β5dNAi,t+1 + β6RDi,t + β7dRDi,t + β8dRDi,t+1 + β9Di,t + β10dDi,t + β11dDi,t+1 + β12dVi,t + 
β13Ci,t + εi,t   
where dXt denotes changes in X from t-1 to t, V denotes firm value, measured as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt, E 
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denotes earnings (EBIT), NA denotes net assets (total assets minus cash), RD is research and development expense, D is common 
dividends, and C is cash holdings.  Columns (3) and (4) report the estimated cash coefficients (β13) from the following regressions for US 
and Japanese firms, respectively, by year: 
Vi,t = α + β1Ei,t + β2dEi,t + β3dEi,t+2 + β4RDi,t + β5dRDi,t + β6dRDi,t+2 + β7Di,t + β8dDi,t + β9dDi,t+2 + β10dNAi,t + β11dNAi,t+2 + β12dVi,t+2 + 
β13Ci,t + εi,t   
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